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Abstract 
Research on implementation in the European Union (EU) is characterized by a strong focus on 
legal conformance with EU policy. However, this focus has been criticized for insufficiently 
accounting for the implications of the EU’s multilevel governance structure, thus providing an 
incomplete picture of EU implementation, its diversity and practice. The contributions of this 
collection represent a shift toward a more performance-oriented perspective on EU 
implementation as problem-solving. They approach implementation fundamentally as a 
process of interpretation of superordinate law by actors who are embedded within multiple 
contexts arising from the coexistence of dynamics of Europeanization, on the one hand, and 
what has been termed ‘domestication’, on the other. Moving beyond legal compliance, the 
contributions provide new evidence on the diversity of domestic responses to EU policy, the 
roles and motivations of actors implementing EU policy, and the ‘black box’ of EU law in action 
and its enforcement. 
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Introduction 
This collection moves beyond legal compliance in European Union (EU) multi-level 
implementation research to shed light on alternative responses to superordinate law, 
practical implementation patterns, and mechanisms to ensure compliance in the EU. In 
response to increasingly complex and transboundary shared regulatory challenges, multi-level 
governance systems like the EU centralize steering tasks and delegate decision-making and/or 
execution competencies to different levels of territorial tiers – supranational (global and 
regional), national, regional (domestic), and local (Levi-Faur 2011: 11; Majone 1999). As 
Thatcher and Coen (2008: 806) point out, the ‘implementation of public policies always raises 
questions of discretion and diversity’. Multi-level systems calibrate integration with member 
state discretion in order to implement common solutions to shared policy problems, tailor-
made to specific local contexts (Kissling-Näf and Wälti 2007; Pülzl and Treib 2007). This in turn 
should enhance the acceptance of centralized policies and, possibly, member state 
performance (Börzel and Hosli 2003; Elmore 1979; Keman 2000). The impact of such multi-
level structures on policy outputs, outcomes and impacts is the subject of multi-level 
implementation research ever since Pressman and Wildavsky (1974) studied ‘[h]ow Great 
Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland’. Its currently dominant line is the rich 
body of literature on implementation in the EU and Europeanization.  
In the quest to connect EU and domestic politics, seminal works on multilevel governance in 
the EU have amply scrutinized the EU’s problem-solving capacity in terms of the impact of the 
EU on domestic institutions and policies at the national and local level (e.g., Featherstone and 
Radaelli 2003; Graziano and Vink 2008; Héritier 1999; Richardson 2012; Scharpf 1997). This 
collection contributes to this discussion. Its basic premise lies in understanding 
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implementation as a core process in the problem-solving cycle. Hence, what is of interest here 
is the actual solutions to shared problems in the EU regulatory space (Knill and Tosun 2012). 
Implementation research has always held contradictory views on the role of discretion for 
policy success (Knill 2015; Pülzl and Treib 2007; Thomann et al. 2016). Accordingly, the 
question of what constitutes successful problem-solving is approached very differently by top-
down and bottom-up implementation perspectives (Hill and Hupe 2014).  
On the one hand, ‘conformance implementation’ refers to the degree to which the centrally 
decided blueprint is implemented from top to down (Barrett and Fudge 1981). This top-down 
school, which dominates Europeanization research, is primarily interested in comparing the 
intended and actually achieved outcomes of implementation, where the degree of the goal 
attainment serves as an indicator for implementation success (Knill 2015). Implicitly or 
explicitly, top-down perspectives tend to view discretion and the resulting deviations from the 
centrally decided rule as a control problem (Thomann et al. 2016). Alternatively, ‘performance 
implementation’ denotes whether a policy achieves outcomes that resolve the original policy 
problem at stake (Barrett 2004; Barrett and Fudge 1981; Mastop and Faludi 1997). This 
process-oriented bottom-up perspective emphasizes the role of policy implementers as 
problem-solvers, whose closeness to the source of the policy problem enhances their ability 
to achieve policy success (Elmore 1979). Hence, it is expected that policy instruments and 
goals may undergo context-sensitive modifications during the process of policy 
implementation. Implementers should have flexibility and autonomy for adjustment to 
facilitate learning, capacity-building and support-building in order to address policy problems. 
Ultimately, effective implementation is measured by the extent to which the perceived 
outcomes correspond with the preferences of the actors involved in the implementation 
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process (Knill 2015). From this perspective, diverse approaches of problem-solving are actually 
an intended result of the decentralized implementation structures of multi-level systems 
(Joachim et al. 2007: 7).  
However, we have very little systematic knowledge about this diversity of policy solutions (see 
however recently Bondarouk and Liefferink 2016; Sager et al. 2014; Thomann 2015a). Multi-
level implementation research – in the EU and beyond - retains a strong top-down focus on 
member state compliance with central state decisions. A telling illustration is the title of a 
recent study which reads: ‘You Can't Make Me Do It’ (Haeder and Weimer 2013; see also 
Whitford 2007). This holds especially for Europeanization research, which is in its vast majority 
concerned with the question of whether EU directives are transposed into domestic law as 
required (see Angelova et al. 2012; Töller 2010; Toshkov 2010; Treib 2014). Accordingly, the 
past twenty-five years of EU compliance research have produced a fair amount of knowledge 
on the full or partial (non-) compliance with EU directives, the timeliness and correctness of 
transposition, the amount of non-compliance and transposition rates (Angelova et al. 2012; 
Töller 2010; Treib 2014). While undoubtedly relevant, several insights suggest that research 
on legal compliance gives us an incomplete picture of EU implementation.  
Indeed, the emphasis on conformance implementation in EU research faces increasing 
critiques as it ‘insufficiently captures the implications of member states being part of a multi-
level system’ (Schmidt 2008: 299), and ‘tends to prejudge the EU as the main source of 
domestic change’ (Börzel and Risse 2012: 2). As Knill (2015) highlights, this perspective relies 
on a highly simplified model of political steering and insufficiently takes into account the role, 
relevance and capacities of actors involved in the execution of a certain policy program. The 
compliance concept captures the degree of conformance implementation, but does not 
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necessarily help us to understand performance (Thomann 2015a). Or, as Bondarouk and 
Liefferink (2016: 2) put it, the ‘approach, by which compliance is juxtaposed to 
noncompliance, masks potentially great variance in responses between authorities and does 
not tell much about the extent of the domestic efforts to implement the policy’. In fact, there 
is growing evidence that under certain circumstances, legal compliance with EU law may be 
unrelated to its practical application (Falkner et al. 2005; Versluis 2003, 2007; Zhelyazkova et 
al. 2016). Accordingly, Treib (2014: 29) highlights that ‘we have as yet comparatively little 
evidence on the extent to which there is non-compliance beyond transposition and on the 
factors that are conducive to effective application and enforcement’. However, if we accept 
the notion that any policy is only as good as its practical implementation (Hill and Hupe 2014; 
Thomann 2015b), then this leaves us with unsatisfactory knowledge about the actual 
problem-solving capacity of the EU (Scharpf 1997). 
In summary, after decades of legal compliance research, much is known about the 
conformance at the legislative stage in the EU, but much less is known about performance in 
practice. Analyzing multi-level implementation beyond legal compliance has a high practical 
relevance not least because in the vein of economic modernization and globalization, policy 
problems have become increasingly complex transboundary and cross-sectoral, which has 
resulted both in an increased demand for regulation and in a blurring of the distinction 
between the global and the national (Levi-Faur 2011). Take, for instance, the enormous 
transformation of EU regulation in the past twenty years (Richardson and Mazey 2015). The 
latter has considerably expanded from a concentration on competition policy to coverage of 
many sectors (Thatcher and Coen 2008), and toward ‘softer’ governance modes (Newig and 
Koontz 2014; Radulova 2007). Notwithstanding the growing empirical relevance of EU rules, 
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many aspects of EU implementation remain a black box, and ‘the tendency to neglect issues 
of enforcement and application has even increased’ (Treib 2014: 15). Against this background, 
it is vital to gain better empirical and theoretical understanding of the degree to which such 
multi-level systems are actually able to address the problems they are intended to solve in 
practice (Sparrow 2000). Not only Europeanization scholars, but also practitioners can benefit 
from such insights to improve policy outcomes. 
Contribution to the state of the art 
To fill these gaps, this collection presents innovative approaches to EU implementation that 
follow recent quests to move beyond legal compliance (Schmidt 2008). Therefore, the studies 
in this collection scrutinize other stages of the implementation cycle and adopt a more 
performance-oriented approach to EU implementation, from various angles. What unites 
them is their reassessment of the relative importance of EU policy, on the one hand, and 
domestic factors and actors, on the other hand in explaining the outcomes of EU 
implementation. Rather than focusing on compliance, they embrace the notion put forward 
by Bugdahn (2005: 177) that ‘the implementation of EU policies is best conceptualized as a 
blend of effective EU influence over domestic policy choices in a given policy area – defined 
as Europeanization – and of domestic choices of non-prescribed or non-recommended policy 
options in the same policy area – which is termed domestication’. The contributions of this 
collection understand Europeanization and domestication as complementary forces, which 
jointly explain the multiple embeddedness of actors (Beyers 2005) involved in EU 
implementation. In this sense, the interplay between Europeanization and domestication is a 
central explanation for performance implementation. Furthermore, the contributions have as 
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their entry point the notion that the ‘transposition of EC directives is – to a very large extent 
–an act of interpretation’ (Voermans 2009: 81). Emphasizing problem-solving and 
performance, these studies hence analyze implementation fundamentally as a process of 
interpretation of superordinate law by actors who are embedded within distinct and multiple 
contexts. In this vein, the collection addresses three closely intertwined sets of salient 
questions that research on legal compliance has left unaddressed.  
A first crucial interest of this collection is to gain a better understanding of the different 
responses to superordinate law in the complex EU multi-level systems, apart from legal 
compliance. This entails two aspects: transposition outcomes other than conformance, as well 
as the question of how policy makers address the complexity of this system when deciding 
over implementation modes. Beyond legal compliance, very little is known about other 
possible transposition outcomes. Recent research suggests that member states differ notably 
in the substantial similarity of domestic policies (e.g., Bondarouk and Liefferink 2016; 
Steunenberg 2007; Sager et al. 2014) and that fully compliant member states go beyond the 
minimum requirements of superordinate law (Voermans 2009). Thomann (2015a) highlights 
the prevalence of the legitimate ‘customization’ of EU law and its implications for 
understanding member states as bottom-up problem-solvers. However, we still lack a 
systematic picture of the diversity of the ‘European experience’ (Majone 1999) – not least 
because research has hitherto invested little in the systematic conceptualization and 
operationalization of such transposition outcomes. It is only then that we can find out: what 
are the more fine-grained patterns of implementation in Europe, and can we identify 
underlying logics in this diversity (Thomann and Zhelyazkova, 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER 
TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>)?  
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Analyzing the diversity of EU implementation is crucial in order to understand trade-offs 
between the well-explored conformance implementation and the more neglected 
performance implementation. This is all the more important as a single model of 
implementing structure does not exist in the EU (Peters 2014: 136; Richardson and Mazey 
2015). Capturing the possible facets of multi-level implementation outcomes requires an 
analytic focus on the management of and responses to the complexity of such systems 
(Hooghe and Marks 2003; Sanderson 2006). While this ‘multi-layer problem’ (Hill and Hupe 
2003) has long been recognized by implementation research, analytical solutions to it still 
need further development. In this context, several contributions have emphasized the 
potential for cross-fertilization between theoretical perspectives on EU implementation, on 
the one hand, and on policy implementation and comparative federalism, on the other (e.g., 
Barrett 2004; Börzel and Hosli 2003; Hill and Hupe 2014; Hooghe and Marks 2003; Keman 
2000; Kissling-Näf and Wälti 2007; Knill and Tosun 2012; Knill 2015; Ongaro et al. 2010; Pülzl 
and Treib 2007; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980; Whitford 2007; Winter 2003). 
Notwithstanding, attempts at connecting Europeanization theory with policy implementation 
theory are still rare (see recently Knill 2015). Taking this agenda further, Heidbreder (2017 
<THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) draws from implementation 
theory in order to identify different implementation types that are responsive to the 
complexity of the EU multilevel setting, depending on functional characteristics of the policy 
and the domestic setting at hand (Heidbreder 2011; Matland 1995). 
After shifting the focus to performance at the legislative stage of implementation, the second 
interest of this collection lies in moving further down the implementation chain and opening 
the ‘black box’ of EU law in action (Versluis 2003, 2007). As individuals implementing public 
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policies effectively act as decision-makers in their own right, understanding domestication 
implies to look at the practical implementation and enforcement of EU policy (Hill and Hupe 
2014; Lipsky 1980/2010; Thomann 2015b). Our present knowledge on the practical 
implementation of EU law is scattered (e.g., Beunen et al. 2013; Falkner et al. 2005; Hartlapp 
and Falkner 2009; Héritier 1999; Versuis 2007). The most conclusive result so far is that the 
‘law in the books’ is not necessarily the same as the ‘law in action’ (Treib 2014: 16; Versluis 
2003) – a lesson which is also drawn in federalist settings (Kissling-Näf and Wälti 2007; Sager 
2007). Previous results suggest that legal compliance levels sometimes tell us little about the 
degree and quality of the practical implementation of centralized law (Beunen et al. 2013; 
Falkner et al. 2005; Hartlapp and Falkner 2009; Zhelyazkova et al. 2016). This insight has 
important implications for practical implementation in terms of the patterns, mechanisms and 
actors involved that need exploration. However, accounting for practical implementation adds 
additional layers of complexity to implementation analyses, and implies a focus on the 
interaction of different governance levels (Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Exadaktylos and 
Radaelli 2012; Hill and Hupe 2003; Knill and Tosun 2012; Kuhlmann and Wayenberg 2016; 
Mavrot and Sager 2016). It also requires a systematic policy evaluation, which is resource-
intensive, underdeveloped in many countries, and needs improvement in the EU (Knoepfel et 
al. 2011; Mastenbroek et al. 2016; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980; Treib 2014). As a result of 
these obstacles, a crucial question remains to be explored: How does practical 
implementation – in terms of conformance and/or performance - look like in the EU multi-
level system, and how can we explain it?  
The current state of the art suggest that there are situations in which member states might 
decide to resolve problems independently of superordinate law (Barrett and Fudge 1981; 
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Mastop and Faludi 1997). How do they perform such shifts from Europeanization to 
domestication in practice? To tackle this question, Dörrenbächer (2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) analyzes the frontline implementation of 
EU immigration policy and uses insights from the behavioral public administration literature 
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2017; Lipsky 1980/2010). Moreover, we hardly know how varying 
capacities for resilience determine member states’ responses to problems, specifically if the 
latter are pronouncedly transboundary, such as air pollution which lack ‘spatial fit’ (Young 
2002). While the potential of multi-level governance for improving policy implementation 
(rather than being an obstacle to it, see Leventon 2015) has been acknowledged in 
implementation theory (Hooghe and Marks 2003), the empirical question of whether this is 
actually the case on the ground has hardly been addressed in the EU literature. As Gollata and 
Newig (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) demonstrate, 
understanding these capacities implies taking a closer look at the horizontal and vertical 
cooperation and coordination between different levels of governance, with additional layers 
of governance being added in a federalist setting (see also Kuhlmann and Wayenberg 2016; 
Mathieu et al. 2016).  
Jensen (2007) highlights that the effective practical implementation of EU policy is also a 
question of oversight and enforcement (Sager 2009). Simultaneously, as the EU has 
traditionally delegated these tasks to member states (Jans et al. 2015; see also Joachim et al. 
2007; Perkins and Neumayer 2007), monitoring and enforcement can be expected to be a 
major source of domestication. The scarce existing evidence suggests that (the possibility of) 
oversight and enforcement is crucial for practical application in the EU, and that its absence 
leads to compliance deficits (Garoupa 2012; Jensen 2007; König and Maeder 2014; 
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Zhelyazkova and Yordanova 2015). Scholten and Ottow (2014) also made first, sector specific 
steps toward a typology of EU enforcement mechanisms (see also Heidbreder 2015). 
However, Tosun (2012: 445) highlights the ‘need for detailed descriptions of how these 
activities are actually pursued’. One reason why this is still missing is that the EU traditionally 
lacks enforcement competencies, and hence little encompassing data is available (Jans et al. 
2015). Interestingly, however, recent years have witnessed a growing focus on the role of EU 
agencies and networks for improving the practical implementation of EU law, who formulate 
implementation guidelines for national agencies, inspect the implementation practices of 
national agencies, and provide training to national inspectors (see e.g. Egeberg and Trondal 
2009; Groenleer et al. 2010; Versluis and Tarr 2013). Scholten (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER 
TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) points to an ongoing trend toward Europeanization in 
this regard. The growing role of the EU in the field of direct enforcement can be explained by 
the problems that indirect enforcement faces; if the ‘traditional’ implementation of regulation 
by national authorities is failing, enforcement at the community level is likely to follow in the 
same policy area (Scholten and Scholten 2016). 
In order to understand the mechanisms underlying patterns of diversity, practical 
implementation and enforcement, it is necessary to address a third question, namely that of 
the different roles and motivations of national actors implementing EU policy. Europeanization 
theory has a long tradition of assuming different logics of action – rationalist or norm-driven - 
underlying implementing actors’ behavior (Jupille et al. 2003; Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006; 
March and Olsen 1998). Concurrently, it has been noted that actors implementing EU policy 
are also multi-hatted (Egeberg and Trondal 2009) in that they are expected to be loyal both to 
EU policy and to national policy. The discussion about a European administrative space has 
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given rise to the question of whether there is such figure as the European public servant (Sager 
and Overeem 2015). As Mastenbroek (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE 
DETAILS AT PROOF>, p. 2) notes, ‘ individual politicians and civil servants involved in 
compliance processes may vary in their propensity to comply with EU law (…). These 
individuals’ stances towards EU law are likely to have consequences for their behavior, and 
thus for the functioning of the larger political-legal system in which they operate- in this case 
the European Union.’ National implementation processes often serve the purpose to correct 
for what implementers perceive to be an inadequate balance between the two (e.g., Thomson 
2010).  
However, little is known about how the multiple embeddedness of actors in the EU multilevel 
system (Beyers 2005) creates diverse identities and problem perceptions, affects the interplay 
of these logics, and ultimately leads actors to lend different priorities to Europeanization and 
domestication, respectively. Part of the problem is that the focus on legal compliance in EU 
implementation research has also implied that the processes of administrative rulemaking, as 
well as the frontline implementation of EU rules, have been neglected (Treib 2014). As a result, 
our empirical knowledge about the importance of EU policy for implementing actors, relative 
to domestic policy, is limited. Empirical analyses of actors’ motivations in the practice of EU 
implementation are urgently needed for a better understanding of the potentials and limits 
of Europeanization (Woll and Jacquot 2010). In this vein, Mastenbroek (2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) analyzes an often neglected category of 
actors, namely legislative drafters and other EU-related legislative tasks, and the 
considerations that may or may not lead them to act as ‘guardians’ of EU law. Dörrenbächer 
(2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) looks at the different 
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motivations driving actors in referring to EU policy and domestic law, respectively when 
implementing EU migration policy at the frontline. 
This collection explicitly seeks to move beyond the ‘universe’ of Europeanization research 
(Treib 2014) in order to benefit from the insights from different strands of literature. We 
intend to show that doing so can contribute importantly to overcoming the lack of cumulative, 
generalizable theoretical knowledge on the problem-solving capacity of multi-level systems 
(Hill and Hupe 2014; Pülzl and Treib 2007). In this vein, the contributions of this collection 
draw from neighboring fields, including general frontline and multilevel implementation 
theory (Dörrenbächer, 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>; 
Heidbreder, 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>), the 
literatures on regulatory change (Thomann and Zhelyazkova, 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER 
TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>), legislative ethics (Mastenbroek, 2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>), social psychology (Dörrenbächer, 2017 
<THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>), multilevel governance 
(Gollata and Newig, 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) and 
regulation (Scholten, 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>). 
Finally, the empirical studies presented here not only involve cross-sectoral comparison 
(Mastenbroek, 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>; Thomann 
and Zhelyazkova, 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>), they 
also explore neglected policy areas beyond environmental and social policies (Treib 2008; 
Töller 2010; Angelova et al. 2012), namely immigration policy (Dörrenbächer, 2017 <THIS 
ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) and air quality policy (Gollata and 
Newig, 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATEDETAILS AT PROOF>). 
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Structure and content of the collection 
Following the different stages of the policy cycle, the collection begins by moving beyond legal 
compliance as a transposition outcome. Thomann and Zhelyazkova (2017 <THIS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) set the stage by discussing conceptual 
considerations and empirical challenges faced by researchers engaging in the systematic 
comparative analysis of the ‘customization’ of EU law to depict diverse interpretations of EU 
rules beyond compliance. By conceptualizing this as a phenomenon of vertical regulatory 
change, they propose a generalized definition of customization and offer a flexible scheme for 
measuring customization both in quantitative and qualitative comparative settings. Their 
empirical analysis provides the first large-scale mapping of the customization of EU 
environmental and justice and home affairs policies in 27 member states. Next to revealing 
the considerable diversity of compliant transposition, they find that customization follows 
pronounced policy-specific EU regulatory logics.  
The contribution by Mastenbroek (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS 
AT PROOF>) sheds light on the roles and strategies by administrative actors responsible for EU 
compliance. She scrutinizes the multiple roles of legislative drafters who are responsible for 
preparing the transposition of EU directives at the national level, and guarding the 
compatibility with ‘autonomous’ national legislation with EU legal injunctions. Specifically, she 
analyzes how these actors deal with their multiple roles resulting from their double-
hattedness as guardians of EU law, on the one hand, and politically loyal national civil servants, 
on the other. Based on qualitative interviews with legislative drafters and their superiors in 
diverse Dutch ministries, she paints a nuanced picture of the role conceptions of these actors 
which guide their reinterpretation of EU law so as to integrate EU legal requirements with 
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national policy objectives, and prioritize one over the other in case of incompatibilities.  
The next two contributions deal with the practical implementation of EU policy. Gollata and 
Newig (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) empirically test 
the proposition underlying theories of polycentric governance, that multilevel governance is 
conducive to effective policy-making and delivery. This expectation is based on the arguments 
about the role of decentralization, spatial fit and participation, combined with a central 
planning and oversight mandate also known as ‘mandated participatory planning’. Using the 
understudied case of the implementation of EU air quality legislation, they study all 137 air 
quality and action plans established since 2004 in German municipalities and agglomerations, 
as a case of a transboundary policy with a lack of spatial fit. Their analysis highlights the 
horizontal and vertical cooperation between different levels of government and 
administrative layers within the same policy arena. While this case does not suggest that 
multi-level governance improved policy delivery, it points to learning and capacity building 
between local implementers.  
Moving further down the implementation chain, Dörrenbächer (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER 
TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) ‘zooms in’ on individuals. Using concepts from social 
psychology, her analysis specifically focuses on the question what instrumental and normative 
motivations drive frontline bureaucrats to use EU law to solve the legal ambiguity arising from 
placing implementers in-between domestic and EU regulatory frameworks. Drawing on 
qualitative interviews with 21 frontline bureaucrats in ten German immigration agencies, 
Dörrenbächer’s analysis provides rare insights into the concrete interplay of Europeanization 
and domestication when EU law is practiced next to national law. Her results suggest that 
these actors use EU law in situations when national regulations remain unclear. This reliance 
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on EU law at the frontline can even correct for problematic transposition. 
The contribution by Scholten (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>) shows that while the power to enforce EU law has traditionally been the 
responsibility of EU Member States, the enforcement stage of the EU policy cycle has been 
moving towards ‘Brussels’ via the proliferation of EU entities with direct enforcement powers, 
EU enforcement networks and the use of EU hard, soft and case law. As Scholten highlights, 
this development raises the question of what role there is to play for the EU in the traditionally 
national field of EU enforcement. She discusses the implications for the EU’s problem-solving 
capacity, as well as challenges posed for the legitimacy, accountability and practical 
effectiveness of EU enforcement. 
The final contribution by Heidbreder (2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS 
AT PROOF>) adopts a conceptual, bird’s eye perspective that connects the dots between the 
complexity of EU implementation beyond compliance and general implementation research. 
Drawing on the distinction between top-down and bottom-up implementation and Hooghe 
and Mark’s (2003) two types of multilevel governance, Heidbreder identifies four 
implementation types with distinct logics in the EU multilevel system: Centralization, 
agencification, convergence and networking. Based on Matland’s (1995) ambiguity-conflict 
model of policy implementation, this enables her to derive causal expectations about which 
implementation type is functionally linked with strategic choices of policy-makers. Based on 
empirical illustrations, she discusses the descriptive and integrative capacity of her framework 
to systematically structure the different implementation practices in the EU and gain a better 
understanding of the potential pitfalls of its multi-level structure. 
In the end, we wrap up the findings of the different studies and discuss their implications in 
 16 
 
view of the benefits of turning toward a more performance-oriented perspective on EU 
implementation as done in this collection (Thomann and Sager 2017 <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER 
TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>). We draw preliminary conclusions about the interplay 
between Europeanization and domestication beyond compliance, while also formulating 
scope conditions, avenues for future research, and implications for practitioners. 
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